




Security Information

75729-i cy. no. 1

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NIE-21/1: Austrian Security Capabilities Following
Withdrawal of Occupation Forces

BACKGROUND

1. NIE-21/1 originated in a request from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI for intelligence on Austria's security capabilities in the event of four-power troop withdrawal. A Board estimate was forwarded to the Secretary on 12 November 1952. The IAC agreed that the Board estimate should be coordinated and issued as NIE-21/1.

2. The data in this estimate on the present capabilities of Austrian security forces and of the Austrian Communists are drawn almost entirely from CIA/FI reports. The estimative judgments arrived at are based on these reports, on discussions held with some of Mr. Wisner's people, as well as on discussions held with the IAC agencies.

SUBSTANCE

3. As far as we can determine, all agencies agree to the present text with one possible exception.

4. Possible G-2 Reservation (page 2, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence)

G-2 may take exception to the estimate that Austrian security forces could cope with a Communist attempt to overthrow the Government even if these forces had less than 90 days in which to be built up before the quadripartite troops were withdrawn.

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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Security Information

75729-1 cy. no. 2

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NIE-21/1: Austrian Security Capabilities Following
Withdrawal of Occupation Forces

BACKGROUND

1. NIE-21/1 originated in a request from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI for intelligence on Austria's security capabilities in the event of four-power troop withdrawal. A Board estimate was forwarded to the Secretary on 12 November 1952. The IAC agreed that the Board estimate should be coordinated and issued as NIE-21/1.

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SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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Security Information

Security Information

75729-1 cy. no. 3

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NIE-21/1: Austrian Security Capabilities Following
Withdrawal of Occupation Forces

BACKGROUND

1. NIE-21/1 originated in a request from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI for intelligence on Austria's security capabilities in the event of four-power troop withdrawal. A Board estimate was forwarded to the Secretary on 12 November 1952. The IAC agreed that the Board estimate should be coordinated and issued as NIE-21/1.

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Assistant Director
National Estimates

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Security Information

75729-1 cy. no. 4

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**SUBJECT: NIE-21/1: Austrian Security Capabilities Following
Withdrawal of Occupation Forces****BACKGROUND**

1. NIE-21/1 originated in a request from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI for intelligence on Austria's security capabilities in the event of four-power troop withdrawal. A Board estimate was forwarded to the Secretary on 12 November 1952. The IAC agreed that the Board estimate should be coordinated and issued as NIE-21/1.

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SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
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